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Eid: Descartes' Influence on Historiography

Descartes' Influence
on Historiography

By Leroy Eid, S.M., Ph.D.

Scepticism is the bane of all sophisticated ages. Pilate's rhetorical question "What
is truth?" and his expectation of receiving no answer to the question remains a classical case of the educated man's confusion. Much of the recent history of the intellectual
in the Western world has concerned itself with the dilemmas where one possibility is
scepticism. When he probes into the foundations of historiography, the specter of doubt
comes back to haunt the historian at every turn. In this little article I would like to
trace some of the effects on history and historiography of Descartes ' attempt to escape the scepticism of his own 17th century.
The Cartesian Dualism remains the most pervasive legacy of Rene Descartes
to his successors. In his own mind there was in fact no division or dichotomy; but
ultimately the majority of his followers, colleagues, and even opponents came to seize
upon one phase only of his involved thought. Thus the history of philosophy in the
century folloWing Descartes' death can be summed up in the two divergent streams
of Rationalism and Empiricism. The really great names of philosophy in the next
centuries are those who try somehow to resynthesize those two diverging streams .
For example, the name Kant immediately comes to mind . Since I want only to discuss how this situation affects history and its study, I shall summarize a few of the
more important elements in the Cartesian dichotomy. Graphically it may be stated
thus:
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Now it would seem that both streams of thought indeed go back to Descartes. Both
are essential elements in the totality of Cartesianism. Likewise in the field of historical
studies, unless both elements are present, a view of history results which Descartes
would have rejected as incomplete. But since in history the fashion has been, as elsewhere, to jump intellectually into only one of the intellectual streams, historiography
is the cataloguing of unsatisfactory attempts at reaching down into the reality that
forms the framework of history.
First let us look at the views that Descartes himself held on history . In the very
first part of the Discourse on Method, he made it quite clear that history had little
value in his eyes as an intellectual discipline. In a short paragraph he seemed to demolish rather thoroughly the usefulness of history. After conceding certain great advantages in the study of history such as the ennoblement of the mind, the maturing
of the judgment, the avoidance of parochial judgments, he launches into the attack: 1
... and those who are too interested in things which occurred in past
centuries are remarkably ignorant of what is going on today {llistorical escapisriJ.2 In addition, fiction 3 makes us imagine a number of
events as possible which are really impossible [Jiistorical pyrrhonisriJ,
and even the most faithful histories, if they do not alter or embroider
episodes to make them more worth reading, almost always omit the
meanest and least illustrious drcumstances so that the remainder is distorted !..fantasy bUilding /. Thus it happens that those who regulate their
behavior by the examples they find in books are apt to fall into the
extravagances of the knights of romances, and undertake projects which
it is beyond their ability to complete or hope for things beyond their
destiny 0nti-utilitaria!il.
The objections are obViously well made. The charge, for example, of historical escapism reminds one of what Lord Acton reputedly said somewhere of his own famous mentor, Dr. Dollinger: "He knew all that could be known about the ninth century;
but although he informed himself about the nineteenth, his thoughts were not there."
Voltaire in the Enlightenment took a long look at what the early seventeenth century
called history, and he more bitingly than Descartes came to the conclusion that modern history should be studied in preference to ancient history in which Voltaire felt
a thousand lies were mixed with a few truths. 4 Voltaire's attitude shows how well
the historical writers took to heart the Cartesian objections.
Generally speaking the relationship between Descartes and the historical pro1 Rene' Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Laurence Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs·
Merrill Co., 1960), p. 7.
2

R. G. Collingwood, 77te Idea of Histo ry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 60.

3

"Narratives" as Collingwood translates this word. Ibid.

4

Fritz Stern ( ed.), 77te Varieties of Histo ry (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 36·37.
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fession is one of challenge and response. The Cartesian objections, mirroring as they
did so well the weltanschauung of his age, 5 helped contribute to the evolution of
those general principles of writing" scientific" history which form the bulk of accepted
historiographic practice. Just six years after the publication of the Discourse, Father
Bollandus, born the same year as Descartes, published his monumental historical
work on hagiography. The great works of Mabillon and his Benedictine school of
careful historical writers began eleven years after the Discourse. These two examples,
however, must not mislead us. The "scientific" historian with his careful sifting of
information is not the total Cartesian ideal. For the so-called Cartesian school of
historians the ideal of sCientific history might have been a sufficient ideal, but not
for Descartes. This attitude of scientific history is the continuation of the stream of
empirical thought leading from the wide use of the Cartesian doubt. This school
of historical thinkers would much later receive their summarizing epigram in the
words of Ranke, the great German historian, that the historian "should tell exactly
what happened." By all odds, the greater number of historians have been and probably are yet primarily in this intellectual flow. They construe their job as being one
of finding out the facts and then telling the story around these facts with objectivity
so that the reality may emerge without any intervention on the part of the historian.
Descartes had another objection to history. More important (from his viewpoint)
than the objections preViously listed was the difficulty that history did not allow for
any generalizations. This indeed was a more cogent argument for a philosopher.
Aristotle, who had two millenia before him, decided that history was of less value
than poetry because poetry had a universalizing quality. 6 Descartes, again, was
historically accurate, for history in his day was primarily considered an art form
which all too often specialized in the exotic and the unusual. Lord Bacon had earlier
classified history as mere brute memory.7 Unlike the Cartesian charge against the
unobjectivity of history, this charge of history as mere factual recitation did not stir
up the majority of historians into a dynamic response. Rather following the advice
and not the example of Voltaire in Candide, the historian tended to work his own
little cabbage patch. 8 Like the muckraker, he did not look up into the great universe
of the generalization. The result is seen in the long list of long-forgotten historians
5 Nothing in this article should be held to mean that there were not other, and at times even greater, in·
fluences at work. For example, the year after the appearance of the Meditations, Galileo died and Newton
was born. For a listing of Descartes ' predecessors in the criticism of the methodology of historians see Con·
stance Smith, Review of Jean Bodin and the 16th Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and His·
tory, by Julian Franklin, History and Th eory, IV ( 1964),99·102.
6

Poetics, 1451 b5.

7 Frands Bacon, ne Advancement a/Learning, ed. G. Kitchin (New York: Dutton and Company, 1934),
p. 69. Since Bacon preferred facts to essences, he turned Aristotle on his head by holding that poetry was
only " feigned history." Ib id. p. 82.
8 Franliois Voltaire, Candide, ed. Haskell Block (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 189. This sentence finishes the work and presumably contains the moral in capsule form.
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whose names fill the pages of the standard textbooks on historiography. The historians who, although long dead, are still alive in their works are precisely those
who did give a generalized moral or message. Whether we agree or not with the
message, these authors still speak to us today . This group of historians is more in
the way of Cartesianism that stressed the use of the clear and distinct idea. Bancroft,
with his great ideal of American democracy, is a good example of this school. Moreover they would hold that history is - to use the traditional terminology of the
historians - more an art than a science. The way historical studies reflected the
dichotomizing of Descartes' thought can be summarized as:

DESCARTES

RATIONALISM

Historians who:

EMPIRICISM

Historians who:

a) insist on necessity of
GENERALIZA nONS

a) stress the objeCtivity of
the sheer FACT

b) defend history as an
ART

b) defend history as a
SCIE CE

The immediate philosophical diSCiples of Descartes tended to have varying opinions on this entire historical question. Some, like Father Mersenne, were eVidently
never impressed by the possibilities of history. This friend of Descartes struck an antihistorical note in denying the value of the knowledge of Oriental languages to distinguish the authentic text of the Sacred Scriptures. Father Mersenne failed to see the
point in the plea of the Dutch professor Sixtus Amama for submission to pure fact. 9
In this regard Mersenne foreshadows those historians of the rationalistic tradition
(e.g., Hegel) who undervalued the problem of getting to the accurate historical data.
On the other hand Pierre Bayle's D ictionnaire historique et critique is the Cartesian doubt carried over into history.lo His historical pyrrhonism arrived at the
indisputable fact, the historical " cogito " resulting from the historical method of dou bting the validity of the documents . Leibniz illustrates this same empirical tradition in
9

Raymond Klib ansky ( eel.), Philosophy and H istory (New York: Harpers, 1963 ), p. 16l.

10 Giambattista Vico , Autobiography, eel . Max Fisch and Thomas Bergin ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1944 ), p. 30.
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his opinion that the young should receive more training in facts than in philosophy.ll
He argued that since moderns demanded proof for historical statements, then the
modern reading public was superior. Leibniz' concept of discrete monads fitted in
very well with the concept of history as an aggregate of indisputable facts.
Some Cartesians, however, were able to integrate better the two disparate elements of the Cartesian synthesis. Hobbes, for example, pointed to the present historical ideal of history writing as being both an art and a science:
For in truth consisteth the soul, and in elocution the body of history.
The latter without the former, is but a picture of history; and the former
without the latter, unapt to instruct. 12
Spinoza, for his part, found an historical approach to Sacred Scripture to be a necessity. He has even been called the Father of Biblical Criticism. Spinoza agreed with
Malebranche that a scholar should not confine himself exclusively to one author,
that is, the Bible could not be studied in a vacuum. Spinoza's application of critical
techniques for verifying the Bible was merely a single instance of the method used
on historical documents in general. But under no circumstance can we consider
Spinoza to be merely a positivistic writer. Rather all his research was marshaled in
the interests of that great philosophical and rationalistic system of pantheism for which
he is so famous. Spinoza is much like his master Descartes, therefore, in combining
both elements of rationalism and empiricism.
A study of Lord Bacon 's thought (a contemporary of Descartes although not
a Cartesian) is rather enlightening. In his earlier works, Bacon had urged the inductive method on the academic world . In this he reflects the empirical attitude which
writes trivia in an ethically neuter style since it posits the doctrine that history can
arrive at no general values or conclusions. Bacon, however, in tinle came to realize
the need for the intuitive positing of theses. 13
This is what the best historians have done. Thus the ideal of modern historiography is the use of facts, tested by the critical apparatus, to verify a posited thesis.
This is seen, for example, in Ranke's positivistic slogan "Tell history as it actually
happened" being braced with the complementary idealistic idea of intuiting the truth.
Like Descartes, Ranke spawned two diametrically opposed schools, the idealistic
11 Leibniz is a good example of why this article does not limit a great thinker by labeling him as a philosopher or a historian. Although Leibniz can be essentially listed as a philosopher, yet he was the author
of three important volumes on the history of the Guelfs and the author of five volumes on the House of
Brunswick . Even the term philosopher-historian does not begin to describe the myriad interests of this great
thinker.
12 Thomas Hobbes, History of the Grecian War Wrillen by Thucydides, ed. Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1843 ), p. XX .
13 Nov"m OrganulIl, Book II, Sections XX and XXI. Edwinn Burtt ( ed. ), The English Philosophers (New
York: Random House, 1939 ).
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school in Germany and the positivistic school in America. 14 As in so many things
Vico, the N eopolitan philosopher, illustrates so well the balanced use of positivistic
and idealistic principles in examining the past. 15 Vico 's famous spiraling and rhythmical corsi and ricorsi - concluded from empirical data - was an attempt to meet
the Cartesian argument that history is valueless if it does not build on those generalizations which make us masters and possessors of the field of human existence. The
following diagram illustrates the relationship between the men we have just discussed.

DESCARTES

RATIONALISM

EMPIRICISM

RA TIONAL - EMPIRICAL
Marsenne

Spinoza

VICO

Bacon - Hobbes - RANKE

Leibniz
Bayle

It would seem to be asking too much of a thinker to expect him to have both
the idealistic and the positivistic elements in the same proportion. In the case of the
two famous historians just listed it appears that Ranke belonged primarily to the
positivistic school while Vico belonged rather first of all to the rationalistic school.
Or to use the terminology of contemporary philosophers of history, we would say
that Vico belonged to the speculative tradition; Ranke better t y P i fi e d the analytic
school. 16 Vico, in other words, belongs to the more traditional philosophy of history; Ranke is baSically a SCientific historian. To relate this to the world of philosophy we would say that Hegelianism was almost pure rationalism. Although there is
some doubt today as to whether Hegel was really so arbitrary in his use of facts as
then known, yet traditionally he and his school are generally considered as being in
opposition to " scientific" historians. On the other hand, the more lasting influence of
the thought of Kant would seem to be in the area of the scientific historians because
the philosophers who followed him appear to belong to the analytical school. There
is a paradox in all this, however. Although this reasoning relates the philosophers
14 Georg 19gers, " The Image of Ranke in American and German Historical Thought, " History and Th eory,
1l(1962), 17-40.
15 A. Armstrong, Review of Tim e and Idea, by Robert Caponigri, Philosophy, XXX (July, 1955 ), 267.
16 \V. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History ( New York: Harper & Row, 1960 ), pp. 7, 9-15, 25-27. Here is a
very clear explanation of the analytic and speculative traditions.
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with preference toward analysis to the scientific historians, yet the analytic philosophers will have practically nothing to do with so unmanageable (from their angle)
a subject as history. On the other hand while most work-a-day historians will have
nothing to do with the breed of philosophical idealists, yet it is just this latter group
that write such good history and who explain so well the actual way the great historians have worked . The following schema summarizes this part of the discussion:

DESCARTES

RATIONALISM

EMPIRICISM

Hegelianism

Kantianism

Speculative

Analytic

17

Few historians

Most historians

History stressed

History deemphasized

Unfortunately a concentrated reading of the historical works of either group
can lead to scepticism . The speculative group is unable to handle the problem of free
will. Thus their magnificent structures strike one as being pure fantasy. The analytical/ scientific group, however, is unable to introduce the question of values. To
the reading public which has seen the German prison camps and the Hiroshima horror this neutral scientific history is irrelevant. Faced with the uselessness of both
streams of history writing, the modern man can logically feel that the existentialist
is correct in holding that history is simply a nightmare. So the more the West has
wrestled with this problem of the intellectual life, the more it writhes in the agony
which is scepticism. Not that the struggle has been useless. Descartes ' doubt started
because he did not know a true story of man; our doubts arise because we have
too many true stories of man's history. 18
Ultimately, therefore, history will no more have the answer than philosophy.
Hegel expressed this best in the pithy statement: " ... peoples and governments
17 L. Krieger feels that the speculative strain which deals with the existence and identity of substantive laws
or patterns should be labeled the " theory of history;" the analytic trend with its heavy emphaSiS on epis·
temological problems would alone be called " philosophy of history. " New York Tim es, Book Review, Sep·
tember 13, 1964. For purposes of this paper I have used a much broader definition of the field belonging
to the philosophy of history.
18 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future ( New York: Viking Press, 1961 ), pp. 82, 87.
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never have learned anything from history." 19 Yet man continues to struggle for
truth, and by a traditional enough step the philosopher at the end of his tether will
often latch onto history. Hume as a young man talked himself into an extreme sceptical position, and then in desperation he turned from logic to history. In his own
time, Hume was noted as England's greatest historian; he was not England's philosopher. Whitehead is a modern example of one who turned from the rationalism of
mathematics to history after the breakdown of the absolutes of the old Newtonian
physics. 2o Today British intellectual life constitutes one superhuman Hume. Ved
Mehta's book 21 on British life illustrates the very close relationship in Britain between philosophers and historians. As Mehta put it, they are like a fly in the flybottle trying to find a way out. So pervasive has this scepticism grown in our day
that to become a best seller among the intellectuals a history book must promise
to shed some light, to reveal some secret thread which gives some kind of meaning
to our life. Toynbee's "challenge and response," Spengler's four seasons, Sorokin's
triad of ideational-idealistic-sensate cultures: these are in fact modern retreads of
Descartes' original intuiting to a clear and distinct idea. They represent attempts to
find meaning through some kind of a faith in an age of science. 22 In other words
it is only by postulating some rather simple formula that we can read into history
enough meaning to escape the nightmare that the complexity of history has become.
Sartre's latest work, the Critique, in title and content goes back to Descartes and
Kant. This philosophy of history was written to escape the horror of the revelations
made by Khrushchev of the Stalinist regime.
This whole tendency can be and has been called a loss of nerve. Perhaps. A
better view might be that the successful philosopher of history is successful because
he combines those complementary rationalist-empiricist elements of the Cartesian system which later thinkers separated. Only in this way can history be - as has been
suggested - a bridge between the " Two Worlds" that Mr. Snow has popularized.
The element of theory or generalization links with the speculative philosophers; the
emphasis on a factual basis obViously is in the tradition of the empiricists. Again
we see how history must hold to the idea of being both an art and a science. Only
thus can it link the empirical-rationalistic strands. To emphasize just one aspect will
perhaps be satisfying to the sceptic on the more naive levels, but will ultimately fail
to resolve doubts.
Proofs of this can be readily found in the great philosophies of history which
are evident today. The compelling power of evolutionary theory comes from the
marriage of rationalism (e.g., in Freud) and the empiricism of Darwin. More strictly
19 Georg Hegel, Phi/oso/llly of H istory, trans. by

J.

Sibree, (New York: The Colonial Press, 1900 ), p. 6.

20 Howard Didsbury, IVhiLehead 's Interpretation of History (Ann Arbor: University microfilms, 1964),
p. 16.
21 Ved Mehta, Fly and the Fly.B ottle ( Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962 ).
22 The point of the definition of the historian as a prophet looking backwards.
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Here the futuristic optimism of the rationalists was combined with the material progress of the inventive, technological mind. Modern Communism also serves as additional proof. Here we see inverted Hegelianism forming an explosive force after being
grounded in the Russian state. Toynbee certainly fits this mold. Although his basic
thought was the result of an intuitive-mystical vision of the entire world of history,
yet he never tires of trying to show how the entire schema is based on empirical facts.
In considering, however, these examples of Evolution, Communism and Toynbee
we see an additional element besides the rationalistic-empirical models. For Toynbee
religion is the key to all history. Communism is a substitute for religion, or perhaps
even is a religion. Evolution forms for many today the only religion that makes
sense. The religiOUS element, therefore, constitutes the necessary cohesive backdrop
for the complete synthesis of reality, as Descartes saw. If we accept the validity of the
argument that Descartes meant what he said when he spoke of his religiOUS devotion
and obedience to faith, then we can see that his philosophy was in reality religious.
In fact it was christocentric. 23 He did for philosophy what Cardinal Berulle (Descartes' friend and mentor) did for theology. Cogito, ergo sum. Sum, ergo Deus est.
Thus the center, principle, and end of the Cartesian philosophy is God. Descartes'
initial intuition had been perceived earlier by St. Augustine. Later, Vico's conviction
that the ideal eternal story existed in the divine mind and was realized in actual
events would show the same Augustinian stamp. 24 So is noted again the thread of
continuity between the great seminal thinkers.
But even the theology of history presents a certain duality. The Christian
thinkers tend to divide along the lines expressed by the incarnational and the eschatological schools. To choose, however, one side alone will be to lose the richness of
truth of the other side. Both the free will principle - God coming down to sanctify
earth; eternity assuring man of the value of temporality - of the incarnationalists
as well as the emphaSiS on the transcendental absolutes of the eschatological school
are necessary for the complete religiOUS picture. The Hegelian emphaSiS on the absolute must be combined with the Kantian emphasis on practical freedom. In Descartes' life the eschatological school, which (in a rough sort of way) 25 parallels
the rationalistic principle we have been talking about, is seen in his B~rullian concepts. The incarnational idea, since it parallels the general empiricist prinCiple, is therefore played down in importance. It is nevertheless present in the anthropocentric
23

JaCXjues Chevalier, " The Spirituality of Descartes," Dublin Review, ( 1950),

36·50.

24 Robert Caponigri, Time and Idea (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953 ), p. 79.
25 The incarnational/ eschatological dichotomy does not parallel strictly the basic division laid down in this
paper. In fact it seems strange to line up, in opposition, the Christo·centrism of Blrulle Witl, the incarnational
school of modern tlleological speculation. I think this mental gymnastic ( from tl,e linguistic viewpoint) rises
from the fact that tl,e modern classification is primarily inspired by Protestant thought which includes in its
intellectual baggage the residuals of a belief in predestination. For them therefore it is natural , as it is not
for a CatholiC, to equate the thought of tl,e last things with the absence of human free will.

Published by eCommons, 1966

124

9

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 3 [1966], No. 3, Art. 3
tendencies of Ignatian spirituality. This spirituality Descartes absorbed in his school
days and its special tendencies were further emphaSized, no doubt, in the Dutch atmosphere of his self-imposed exile. It was Holland, it must be remembered, that gave
the world the Imitation of ChTis~ the very bible of the man-centered religious life.
The Imitation was esteemed by Ignatius to be more important than the Bible in the
practical role of forming the religious man.

DESCARTES

RA TIONALISM

EMPIRICISM

B~rulle

Jesuits

(Hegelian)

(Kantian)

Eschatological

Incarnational

Absolute principle

Free-will principle

What would happen if Descartes were to reappear today? Although the thought
is purely speculative, it would seem to follow that Descartes could not but agree to
the present historical emphasis on the scientific determination of facts. On the other
hand, Descartes would like the historian who by some kind of intuitive-rationalist
process would formulate some great generalizations. Finally, as a religiOUS person
of some intensity of devotion, he would accept the need for a religiOUS element in the
discussion of the Significance of history. It would seem that the closest thing to the
Cartesian idea for the complete historian would be the religiOUS philosopher of history who bases himself as closely as possible on the known facts. This too would
be the twentieth-century Cartesian answer to the contemporary sceptic.
Let us now conclude by summarizing briefly the effect of Descartes on history.
First of all we note that the general label of Philosophy of History includes not only
the field of history proper with its subdivision of world history, but also the areas
where philosophy and theology touch history. We have noted at some length that
historical-philosophical studies fit into the two categories called the speculative and
analytic. In similar manner the theology of history branches off into the two areas
known as the incarnational and eschatological. In all three areas the parts which
parallel the rationalist principle were affected in a positive fashion by the teachings
of Descartes. The areas paralleling the empirical principle were affected especially in
a negative fashion, that is, through the use of the methodical doubt the critical atti-
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tude becomes so devastating that scepticism is a natural result. In this concluding
chart the dotted lines represent the empirical principle.
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of History

-- --

Universal or general history

- - - History proper

~ Speculative

Philosophy

-- --

- - - Analytic
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- - - Incarnational
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